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RESUMO
Examina o direito dos pais de conduzirem a educação de seus filhos em idade escolar e como tal prerrogativa se relaciona com as leis de freqüência
escolar obrigatória, uma vez que a escolha dos pais se constitui um tipo de controle de qualidade.
Alega que, ao levarem a cabo as leis de educação compulsória, as autoridades estatais não podem ultrapassar certo limite, sob pena de violarem os
direitos constitucionais dos alunos e dos seus responsáveis. Menciona alguns casos em que houve intervenção do Judiciário, com decisões favoráveis
aos estatutos de educação obrigatória ou aos pais e estudantes que alegaram infração de suas liberdades individuais.
Após algumas ponderações acerca dos direitos dos estudantes, conclui com reflexões sobre o NCLB – No Child Left Behind Act, lei federal recente que
determina a responsabilidade da escola pelo desempenho acadêmico do aluno, contendo provisões que possibilitarão aos pais retirarem seus filhos
de escolas públicas ruins e matriculá-los em outras de sua escolha.
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1 INTRODUCTION
When dealing with the issuesof quality control and therights of parents to direct the
upbringing of their school aged
children1, one of the key factors that
impacts on parental rights are
compulsory attendance laws. Put
another way, insofar as parents must
educate their children, whether in re-
gular public or non-public schools, or
by home schooling them,
controversies arise over the extent to
which the rights of parents clash with
those of state officials as they, too,
try to direct the schooling of children
as they follow their mandate to help
ensure an educated citizenry.
The parental right to direct the
upbringing of their children ultimately
operates as a form of quality control.
Parental choice is a form of quality
control because it allows those who
wish to, and can afford to, to have their
children educated in non-public
schools. In an attempt to offer all
parents similar options, a recent fe-
deral law, the “No Child Left Behind
Act”2, enacted in 2002, includes
provisions that will allow parents to
remove their children from failing
public schools and send them to
schools of their choice.
In light of the tension that the
issue of quality control raises, this
paper begins with an examination of
parental rights vis-à-vis compulsory
attendance laws before examining
selected student rights. The paper
concludes with reflections on how the
NCLB’s quality control provisions may
impact on the rights of parents and
students.
2 COMPULSORY EDUCATION
AND PARENTAL RIGHTS
2.1 IN GENERAL
Under the Tenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution3, and
as reiterated by the Supreme Court in
its only case on school finance, San
Antonio v. Rodriguez4, education is a
responsibility of individual states
rather than the federal government. As
such, in 1852 Massachusetts became
the first jurisdiction in the United
States to enact a compulsory
attendance law5. American Courts
have generally upheld compulsory
education statutes against charges
that they unreasonably infringed on
individual constitutional liberties6. In
permitting compulsory attendance
laws to remain in effect along with
exceptions such as for parents who
wish to send their children to non-
public schools or educate them via
home schooling, as well as for married
students, the courts recognize that
these statutes represent a valid
exercise of state police power7 that is
served by the creation of an
enlightened citizenry.
Based on the concept of in loco
parentis, literally, “in the place of the
parent,” compulsory attendance laws
are grounded in the common law
presumption that parents voluntarily
submit their children to the authority
of school officials8. Yet, a question can
be raised about the continuing
viability of the presumed voluntary
nature of in loco parentis in light of
compulsory attendance laws (and
other school rules9) which require
parents to send their children to school
at the risk of punishment for
noncompliance10. An alternative
justification is that compulsory
attendance is rooted in another
common law principle, parens patriae,
literally “father of the country,” under
which state legislatures have the
authority to enact reasonable laws for
the welfare of their residents11. Placing
this dispute aside in the interest of
addressing the practical issues
associated with compulsory
attendance laws, suffice it to say that
courts agree that parents12 must
ensure that their children are
educated. Whether parents satisfy
their duty, or whether students are
absent from school without
justification, is a duty of school
officials13. In one such case, where
school officials failed to prove an
essential element of the crime of
failing to send her daughter regularly,
namely that they did not demonstrate
that she did so knowingly or
purposefully, the Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed her conviction for
having allegedly violated the state’s
compulsory attendance statute14. In
another case, an appellate court in
Wisconsin held that a mother could
raise the affirmative defense that her
son disobeyed her order to attend
school15. In reversing the mother’s
conviction, the panel explained that
the trial court erred in not permitting
the mother to raise the disobedience
defense.
As state and local officials
enforce compulsory education laws,
their goal is to strike a reasonable
balance between the rights of
individuals and the state. Even so,
there is a point beyond which state
officials may not go without violating
the constitutional rights of students
and their parents. Insofar as exactly
where this point is cannot be
determined in the abstract, the courts
have intervened in cases where
parents, and students, claimed that
public officials intruded into their
personal rights.
The most basic constitutional
limitation on compulsory education
laws is that parents can satisfy them
by means other than having their
children attend public schools since
the primary goal of these statutes is
to ensure that individuals obtain a
minimum level of education rather than
focus on where the education is
provided. The Supreme Court first
enunciated this principle Pierce v.
Society of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary (Pierce)16
when it struck down a law from
Oregon which would have required
children, other than those needing
what would today be described as
special education, between the ages
of eight and sixteen to attend public
schools. Pierce was filed by educators
in two non-public schools, one
religiously affiliated and the other a
military academy. Officials sought to
avoid having their schools being
forced out of business, basing their
claims on property rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In addition to
accepting the schools’ due process
claim, the Court, observing that since
parents had the right to direct the
upbringing of their children, decided
that they could satisfy the compulsory
attendance statute by sending their
children to non-public schools. The
Court also acknowledged that state
officials could reasonably ( ) regulate
all schools, to inspect, supervise, and
examine them, their teachers and
pupils17. In practice, other than health
and safety code issues, state officials
typically impose fewer restrictions on
non-public schools than they do on
public.
Previously, in Meyer v.
Nebraska,18 the Supreme Court
invalidated a prohibition against
teaching a foreign language in gra-
des lower than the ninth under which
a teacher in a non-public school was
convicted of teaching German. In the
aftermath of World War I and
widespread opposition to most things
German, the Court rejected the
statute’s purported goal of promoting
civic development by inhibiting
training of the young in foreign
tongues and ideals before they could
learn English and acquire American
ideals. In finding that the statute
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limited the rights of modern language
teachers to teach, of students to gain
knowledge, and of parents to control
the education of their children, the
Court emphasized that there was no
showing of harm which the state had
the right to prevent and that no
emergency had arisen which rendered
the knowledge of a language other than
English to be so clearly harmful as to
warrant i ts prohibit ion. While
conceding that it did not question the
state’s power over the curriculum in
tax-supported public schools, the
main pillar of its analysis involved the
constitutional right to pursue an
occupation not contrary to the public
interest.
Wisconsin v. Yoder (Yoder)19
represents perhaps the most
noteworthy exception to judicial
support for compulsory attendance
laws. In Yoder the Supreme Court ruled
in favor of Amish parents who
challenged the refusal of state officials
to exempt their children from formal
education beyond eighth grade. The
parents maintained that since their
children received all of the preparation
that they needed in their communities,
it would have been unnecessary for
them to attend high schools. Relying
on the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause, the Court agreed that
the community’s almost three hundred
year way of life would have been
gravely endangered, if not destroyed,
by enforcing the compulsory
education law. The Court reiterated
that while there is no doubt as to the
state’s power to impose reasonable
regulations over basic education, in
balancing the competing interests, it
had to give greater weight to the First
Amendment and the traditional
interests of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children.
The Court concluded that since the
Amish way of life and religion were
inseparable, requiring the children to
attend public high may have
destroyed their religious beliefs.
Justice Douglas’ partial dissent
questioned whether children had
rights apart from their parents, given
his fear that students could have been
“harnessed” to the lifestyle of their
parents without opportunities to
express their personal preferences.
Under Yoder, it becomes clear
that few, if any, members of other
religions can meet its test for avoiding
compulsory education requirements.
Other than the Amish, courts
consistently deny religion-based
applications for exceptions to
substantial or material parts of
compulsory education requirements
such as home schooling20 and sex-
AIDS education21. In one case, the
federal trial court in Connecticut
asserted that school officials did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause by
rejecting a father’s request that his son
be excused from a mandatory health
education course and by assigning
him a failing grade when refused to
do so. Further, an interesting case
involving parental complaints arose in
Massachusetts over an explicit sex-
education program22. In upholding the
authority of local school officials over
the content of the curriculum, the First
Circuit noted that the parental right to
direct the upbringing and education
of their children does not encompass
broad-based right to restrict flow of
information in public schools.
2. 2 HOME SCHOOLING
Parents who chose not to send
their children to public schools must
provide them with equivalent
instruction elsewhere either by having
them educated in non-public schools
or via home schooling. As with other
areas involving compulsory
attendance, statutes and regulations
dealing with equivalent instruction are
generally upheld23. The Supreme Court
of Ohio made an exception to this rule
in finding that the state’s minimum
standards were so pervasive and all-
encompassing that total compliance
by a nonpublic school would have
effectively eradicated the distinction
between public and nonpublic
education24. Further, as reflected by
cases from the Supreme courts of
Georgia25 and Wisconsin26,where laws
and regulations lack sufficient clarity
with regard to standards for non-public
schools, they are unenforceable.
After a flurry of activity in the
1980s, home schooling is now legal
throughout the Nation as more than
thirty states have enacted explicit
statutes. The remaining jurisdictions
make home schooling legal under
laws dealing with alternative27
comparable28, equivalent29, or other30
instruction (including tutors)31 and/ or
private32, church33, or parochial34
school exceptions.
Following legislative and
regulatory approval of home
schooling, courts have still had to
address an array of issues such as
teacher qualifications, curricular
content, and state oversight. Although
most states do not have explicit
educational requirements for parents
who home school their children, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota
acknowledged that the state could
expect them to meet reasonable
certification requirements35. Further,
the Supreme Court of Michigan
indicated that teacher certification
requirements violated the free
exercise rights of parents as applied
because state officials failed to show
that they were the least restrictive
means of achieving the state’s
claimed interest36. According to the
court, this approach violated the rights
of parents who home school their
children since the state legislature did
not require teachers in non-public
schools to be certificated and
permitted individuals who lacked
state cert i f ication to serve as
substitute teachers in public schools.
Most states require parents
who home school their children to cover
specified subject areas. Even so,
litigation has arisen over the content
of the curriculum. For example, the
Sixth Circuit, in a case from Kentucky,
affirmed that a statute requiring
The most basic constitutional limitation on compulsory education
laws is that parents can satisfy them by means other than
having their children attend public schools since the primary goal of
these statutes is to ensure that individuals obtain
 a minimum level of education rather than focus on where the
education is provided.
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children who were home schooled to
pass an equivalency examination in
order to receive credit for a home
study program did not violate the due
process, equal protection, or free
exercise rights of the student and or
his parents based on the
commonwealth’s desire to ensure that
it had an educated citizenry37. Relying
on similar analysis, a federal trial court
in Texas rejected a claim from a home
schooling family that requiring
students from non-accredited or home
schools to pass proficiency exams at
their own expense in order to receive
credit toward graduation violated a
student’s rights to equal protection
and free exercise of religion38.
In the related matter of
oversight, courts have upheld the right
of state officials to ensure that
students are progressing in school
whether by means of standardized
tests39 or other measures such as
portfolios40 and annual reports.41
However, both the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts42 and the
Ninth Circuit 43 inval idated
requirements that would have
subjected home schooling families to
state visitations in essential ly
agreeing that this kind of oversight was
overly intrusive since the same
information could have been obtained
in other ways such as having parents
submit written reports. At the same
time, an appellate court in
Massachusetts affirmed that when
home schooling parents refused to
provide school officials with the bare
essentials of the educational plan they
created for their children or to permit
any evaluation of their educational
attainment, commonwealth authorities
could proceed with taking steps to
have them declared as being in need
of protection and committed to the
care of the Department of Social
Services44. In like fashion, an appellate
panel in Missouri affirmed that while
a trial court erred in its discussion of
the length of a school term, state
officials had the authority to take
jurisdiction over an autistic or nearly
autistic child45. The court agreed that
the parents could be charged with
educational neglect since they failed
to administer the required hours of
instruction or keep proper records of
the child’s work and progress.
2.3 EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE:
AN ATTEMPT AT QUALITY CONTROL
Beginning in the 1970s, in
interesting extension of the battle over
parental rights, parents and others
sought to render school boards liable
for perceived failures in educational
results allegedly due to pedagogical
errors committed during a child’s stay
in school. Malpractice is a term of art
for negligence of professional
personnel, usually those who work in
a one-to-one relationship with clients,
such as physicians or lawyers. To
date, al l  efforts to establish a
“educational malpractice” in regular
education have failed46 since it is  (...)
a tort theory beloved of commentators,
but not of courts47. Of course, there is
wide-spread litigation for negligence
in situations where students are
injured at school.
In a leading case, parents
charged that school officials wrongly
permitted their son, who could read
only at the eighth grade level, to
graduate from high school. The student
and his parents sought redress for
having attended school for twelve
years yet only being qualified for
employment requiring little or no ability
to read or write. An appellate court in
California, in rejecting the suit,
discussed at length the duty of care
concept in the law of negligence48. The
court explained that the claim was not
actionable since there was no
workable rule of care against which to
measure the alleged conduct of
school officials, no injury within the
meaning of the law of negligence, and
no perceptible connection between
the educators’ conduct and the
student’s alleged injury. In other
words, the court was convinced that
the student’s claims were too
amorphous to be justiciable under a
theory of negligence. In addition, the
court dismissed a charge of
intentional misrepresentation because
even though the student and his
parents had the opportunity to do so,
they could not allege facts to show
the requisite element of reliance on the
asserted misrepresentation.
Along with the reasons cited
above, other courts recognized the
difficulties of measuring damages and
the public policy considerations that
the acceptance of such cases would,
in effect, have positioned them as
overseers of day-to-day operation of
schools49. To this end, courts ruled
that since aggrieved parents have
recourse through the administrative
channels of local boards and state-
level education agencies, they are not
helpless bystanders as decisions are
made affecting the education of their
children. Of course, as evidenced in
the voluminous litigation on the tort of
negligence, if a specific act of a
school employee directly, or
intentionally, causes an injury to a
student, liability may apply.
3 STUDENT RIGHTS
3.1 DISCIPLINE
3.1.1 IN GENERAL
In order properly to carry out
their duties, courts recognize that in
imposing discipline, school officials
need discretion to impose some forms
of punishment50. As long as discipli-
ne policies and procedures satisfy
due process, courts usually uphold
the actions of educators as long as
they are not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. It is long held that
courts take the sex, age, size, and
mental, emotional, and physical
conditions of students and the nature
of their offenses into consideration
when evaluating penalties51.
When reviewing the disciplinary
actions of school officials, courts
consider whether punishments involve
the withholding the right to attend
school or privi leges such as
participation in extra-curricular
activities. While courts expect
educators to provide students with
greater due process protections when
they seek to deny them the right to
attend school, they cannot act
arbitrarily or capriciously in excluding
students from extra-curricular activities
even as they impose higher
standards for participation such as
drug testing52.
Courts ordinarily do not review
student conduct rules with the same
scrutiny that they apply to criminal
laws. For example, Wood v.
Strickland, involved the attempted
expulsion of students in Arkansas for
consuming alcoholic beverages at
school or school activities, the Court
acknowledged that the federal
judiciary is not supposed to (...)
supplant the interpretation of [a]
regulation of those officers who
adopted it and are entrusted with its
enforcement53 adding that Section
1983 does not extend the right to
relitigate in federal court evidentiary
questions arising in school
disciplinary proceedings or the proper
construction of school regulations54. In
Board of Education of Rogers,
Arkansas v. McCluskey, a brief per
curiam judgment upholding the
suspensions of students who were
intoxicated on school grounds, the
Court recognized that (...) a school
board’s interpretation of its rules [may
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be] so extreme as to be a violation of
due process55 a situation that was not
present in the case at bar. In a recent
case from Illinois that relied heavily
on this decision, the Seventh Circuit
ruled that school officials who
expelled a student for six weeks for
public indecency and possession of
pornography, after he was
photographed in shower following
wrestling practice, did not violate his
right to substantive due process56. The
court wrote that even though officials
exercised questionable judgment in
excluding the student from school,
they had not violated his substantive
due process rights since he received
a hearing and the punishment did not
rise to the level of conscience
shocking.
As to the common practice of
verbal warnings, in an older case, an
appellate court in Illinois reiterated the
rule that teachers can verbally
chastise students as long as
disparaging remarks are not malicious
or wanton57. The Third58 and Eighth59
Circuits echoed similar sentiments in
affirming that teachers did not violate
the rights of students where their
actions did not rise to the level
required to support claims that they
violated the substantive due process
rights of the children since their
behavior was not shocking to the
conscience.
Among the many cases dealing
with punishments, courts refused to
overturn such penalties as having a
child clean a toilet with his bare
hands60, being adjudicated delinquent
for threatening teacher61, being named
a ward of the court for bringing a knife
to school62, being adjudicated
delinquent for making a false fire alarm
report at school63, making obscene
remarks to a teacher64, disrupting
school65, being given a grade of zero
for the first offense of plagiarism on
an assignment66, being dismissed
from a marching band for missing a
performance67, being seated at an
isolated desk due to disruptive
behavior68, and being adjudicated
delinquent for violating a statue
against the possession of a weapon
at school for bring a paintball guns
and makers to school69. On the other
hand, courts found that penalties such
as conviction for disorderly conduct
where a student threatened to shoot
up a school since no one took him
seriously and there were no weapons
in his home 70, adjudication as a
juvenile delinquent for having a butter
knife in a locker since it was incapable
of being used as a deadly weapon71,
and a conviction for assault for
throwing a partially-eaten apple at a
teacher72 were impermissible.
3.1.2 CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
Under common law, teachers
have the right to administer reasonable
corporal punishment. In fact, absent
growing statutory prohibitions against
corporal punishment, school officials
may employ corporal punishment
even against parental wishes73 as long
as local board policies authorize its
use74. If not contrary to state-level
provisions, board policies general
control75. The use of unreasonable
corporal punishment or that violates
board policy or state law can serve
as cause for dismissing teachers76.
In its only case on the merits
of the issue, Ingraham v. Wright77, the
Supreme Court held that corporal
punishment was not per se
unconstitutional. Decreeing that the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual
punishments was designed to protect
those guilty of crimes and did not
apply to paddling students in order
to maintain discipline, the Court
rejected an analogy between children
and inmates. In observing that most
states that addressed corporal
punishment permitted its use, and that
professional and public opinion have
long been divided on the practice, the
Court refused to strike it down as
unconstitutional.
In fact specific cases, the
Fourth78, Tenth79, and Eleventh80
Circuits, as well as federal trial courts81
agree that students can proceed with
substantive due process claims where
punishments are (...) so brutal,
demeaning, and harmful as literally to
shock the conscience of a court82.Yet,
on two occasions the Fifth disagreed,
positing that state statutory and
common law provisions offered better
redress in the way of damages and
possible criminal liability rather than
vit iate the use of corporal
punishment83. As reflected in the
circuit court cases noted above, most
l i t igation involving corporal
punishment have been decided in fa-
vor of teachers based on the
presumption of correctness which
complaining students and parents
were unable to overcome84.
3.1.3 SUSPENSION AND
EXPULSION
It almost goes without saying
that suspension and expulsion are the
most serious penalties that school
officials can impose on students.
Allowing for variations in terminology
from one jurisdiction to another,
suspension generally refers to
temporary exclusion for a specified
period or until students and their
parents satisfy a specific condition
while expulsion indicates a permanent
removal from school. As discussed
in greater detail below, the elements
of due process depend to a
substantial extent on the length of the
exclusion being considered.
Even though courts generally
uphold the use of discipline in
schools, cases often hinge on whether
educators provided students with
adequate procedural due process
protections. While due process does
not require school officials to afford
students all of the safeguards present
in criminal, or, for that matter, civil85
proceedings, essential elements
depend on the circumstances and
gravity of potential punishments. At
the very least, when students are
After a flurry of activity in the 1980s, home schooling is now legal
throughout the Nation as more than thirty states have enacted explicit
statutes. The remaining jurisdictions make home schooling
legal under laws dealing with alternative comparable, equivalent, or
other instruction (including tutors) and/or private,
church, or parochial school exceptions.
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subject to the imposition of significant
disciplinary penalties, they are entitled
to notice and an opportunity to
respond to a fair and impartial third
party decision-maker86.
The Fifth Circuit provided
perhaps the earliest set of guidelines
as to the nature of the notice and
hearing required prior to a long term
exclusion in a case where a student
was to be expelled from a public
college for non-academic reasons87.
According to the court, notice should
contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which, if proven,
would justify an expulsion. The court
added that since assessing
misconduct depends on collecting
facts that can be easily colored by
witnesses, a decision maker must
hear both sides in considerable detail.
The same court subsequently
applied these criteria to a 30–day
suspension in a public school88.
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit ruled
that students are not entitled to the
names of witnesses and information
about their testimony89 and the Second
Circuit agreed that witnesses were not
essential where credibility of evidence
was not at issue90. However, the Ninth
Circuit required production and cross-
examination of witnesses91.
Shortly thereafter, in Goss v.
Lopez (Goss)92, the Supreme Court
specified the minimum constitutional
requirements in a case involving a
suspensions of ten days or less. In a
dispute from Ohio, students who did
not receive a hearing challenged their
ten day suspensions for allegedly
disruptive conduct. Ruling in favor of
the students, the Court wrote that due
process requires that they be given
(...) oral or written notice of the
charges against [them] and, if [they]
denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present [their] side of
the story93. Even so, the Court
reasoned that there is no need for a
delay between school officials’ giving
students notice and the time of their
hearings. The Court thus
acknowledged that in most cases,
disciplinarians may informally discuss
the alleged misconduct with students
minutes after it occurred94.
At the same time, the Goss
Court explained that if students’
presence constitute threats of
disruption, they may be removed
immediately with the due process
requirements to be fulfilled as soon
as practicable95. The Court expressly
rejected requirements for allowing
representation by counsel, for
presenting witnesses, and for
confronting and cross-examining
adverse witnesses in short term
exclusions from school 96.  In
concluding, the Court emphasized
that [ l]onger suspensions or
expulsions for the remainder of the
school term, or permanently, may
require more formal procedures ...
[and that] in unusual situations,
although involving only a short
suspension, something more than the
rudimentary procedures will be
required97.
Two years later, in upholding
the constitutionality of corporal
punishment in Ingraham v. Wright98,
the Supreme Court addressed
procedural due process. In pointing
out that although corporal punishment
implicates a constitutionally protected
liberty interest, traditional common
law remedies afford adequate due
process. Refusing to impose a
constitutional requirement of advance
procedural safeguards, cit ing
impracticability and cost as factors
outweighing any incremental benefit,
unlike Goss, the Court did not think
that corporal punishment deprived
students of property rights because
their educations were not be
interrupted and state courts could set
procedural, and substantive,
restrictions on such discipline99.
Shortly after Goss, federal trial
courts began to apply its procedural
requirements to student transfers for
disciplinary reasons100 and three day
suspensions101. Both courts agreed
that where the property interests of
students were involved, they were of
sufficient magnitude to qualify for the
minimal constitutional due process
protections. A more recent federal trial
court in Texas reached the same
outcome where a student was
suspended for three days for taking
allegedly compromising photographs
of principal’s car parked in front of
female teacher’s house102. However,
in cases where students were involved
in criminal misconduct, the Fifth103 and
Eleventh104 Circuits disagreed in
maintaining that since they were
transferred to alternative schools
within their districts and did not suffer
the losses of property interests, they
were not entitled to hearings. On the
other hand, the Sixth Circuit remanded
a similar dispute where a student was
transferred due to criminal
misbehavior for consideration of
whether his not being provided with a
hearing violated his rights105.
The argument that more
extensive process is required when
disciplinary penalties indirectly lead
to academic disadvantages is not
necessarily persuasive. In such a
case, an appellate court in Illinois
refused to intervene where a student’s
missing examinations due to a three-
day suspension led to a grade
reduction since its timing was not
intended to make it a more onerous
penalty106. The Seventh Circuit
reached a similar result where the
effect of a three-day suspension
delayed a student’s graduation107. In
the f irst of three cases from
Pennsylvania, an appellate court
decided that a student whose
suspension overlapped graduation by
one day did not have a constitutionally
protected property right to attend the
ceremony since it was only symbolic
and not an essential component of his
education; he eventually received the
diploma108. Further, where a student
who completed all of the requirements
for graduation was expelled on
graduation day for selling drugs, the
court ordered school officials to issue
the diploma109. More recently, where
a student was suspended for a variety
of offenses but completed her course
work, examinations, and all
requirements necessary for
graduation, an appellate court
affirmed that she could not be denied
her high school diploma110.
The judiciary does not expect
students to receive full judicial
proceedings. Yet, at the very least,
students facing expulsions are entitled
to notice indicating the time and place
of some form of hearings111. Students
should also be informed of the charges
and the nature of the evidence against
them112, but not necessarily to pre-
hearing notice of particular code or rule
infractions where a student and his
parents had repeated warnings that
he faced expulsion for possession of
marijuana113, and a judgment on the
record114 reached by a fair and
impartial decision maker who acts
based on the content of the record115.
Courts declared that students are not
entitled to have attorneys present as
trial counsel116, to know the identity
of117 and/or to confront witnesses118,
especially where there may be clear
and serious danger to student
witnesses119. As reflected by a case
from the Sixth Circuit, the balance
between any right of confrontation and
danger to accusers is a fine one in
some situations. The court concluded
that generally the necessity of
protecting student witnesses from
reprisal and ostracism outweighs the
value to the truth-determining process
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of allowing them to cross-examine
their accusers.120
Other courts agreed that
students do not have rights to hearing
off icers who are not school
employees121 or, as noted early to
Miranda warnings when questioned
by school officials. In a case that
addressed various elements of due
process, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
that a middle school student in
Arkansas failed to prove that school
officials violated his procedural due
process rights over his expulsion
following an altercation with teacher
and principal, where his mother was
fully informed of the grounds for his
expulsion and he received a hearing
at which he was represented by
counsel who had a full opportunity to
examine and cross-examine
witnesses122. The court acknowledged
that even though educators violated
board rules by not supplying the
student’s attorney with statements of
two witnesses in advance of the
hearing, this did not amount to a
constitutional violation. On the other
hand, some courts found that students
do have a right to have an attorney
present123, to a redacted version of
disciplinary records124, to cross-exa-
mine witnesses125, and to an impartial,
non-school, third party decision-
maker126.
3.2 FREE SPEECH
AND EXPRESSION
Aware of the dearth of directly
applicable precedent relating to
student art work, the common thread
in cases involving expressive activity
is speech, regardless of whether it is
spoken or written.  As evidenced by
its watershed ruling in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community
School District,127 the Supreme Court
was unwilling to impose restrictions
on student free speech, especially
when it was political.   In Tinker the
Court upheld the rights of students in
Iowa to wear armbands as a form of
passive, non-disruptive protest
against American involvement in Viet
Nam.  In commenting that since
school officials lack absolute power
and that pupils do not shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate128 the Court ruled
that absent a reasonable forecast [of]
substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities129
school officials could not infringe upon
students’ constitutional right to
freedom of expression.  Even though
Tinker dealt with political speech, it
has been applied in a variety of
settings.
Almost two decades after
Tinker, and tacitly acknowledging the
different political, and social climate
in American schools, the Court
modified its views, at least as it rela-
tes to non-political speech, in the two
more recent cases which involved
student expression, the first spoken,
the second written. Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser130 examined
a controversy where a high school
student in Washington state was
punished after he delivered a
nominating speech at an assembly
that violated the school’s “disruptive
conduct rule” by intentionally including
the use of sexual innuendo131. In
upholding a three day suspension
and the student’s being removed from
the possible list of speakers at his
graduation, the Court reasoned that
school officials acted entirely within
their permissible authority where a rule
proscribing “obscene” language and
the pre-speech admonition of teachers
gave him adequate warning that his
speech might have led to the
sanctions that were, in fact, imposed.
The Court concluded that the First
Amendment did not prohibit school
officials from punishing the student
where his expressive activities
undermined the school’s basic
educational mission.
Hazelwood  School District v.
Kuhlmeier132 reviewed a controversy
over the rights of student-authors in
Missouri who wrote articles about
teenage pregnancy and the effects of
divorce on students at their high
school as part of a in-class, wholly
school-sponsored newspaper, an
activity for which they received
academic credit.  After a teacher and
the school’s principal reviewed the
articles, the latter decided to remove
them from the newspaper because it
was being published too near to the
end of the school year and there was
insufficient time to make revisions.
The principal was concerned not only
about the inability to keep the identity
of the pregnant students confidential
but also that the parents who were
discussed in the article on divorce
should have been afforded the
opportunity to respond to remarks
about them or give their permission
for them to be printed.  Aware of the
need to permit educators to exercise
discretion in light of local community
standards, the Court declared that
[w]e hold that educators do not offend
the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school
sponsored expressive activities so
long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns133.
4 CONCLUSION
The NCLB, which is actually an
extension of the original Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965,
is designed in part to require public
schools to demonstrate greater
accountabil i ty for academic
achievement134. The key elements in
the NCLB are to improve academic
achievement among students who are
economically disadvantaged; assist
in preparing, training, and recruiting
highly qualif ied teachers (and
principals); provide improved
language instruction for children of
limited English proficiency; make
school systems accountable for
student achievement, particularly by
imposing standards for annual yearly
Even though courts generally uphold the use of discipline in schools,
cases often hinge on whether educators provided students
with adequate procedural due process protections.
While due process does not require school officials to afford students
all of the safeguards present in criminal, or, for that matter,
civil proceedings, essential elements depend on the circumstances
and gravity of potential punishments.
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progress for students and districts;
require school systems to rely on
teaching methods that are research
based and that have been proven
effective; and afford parents better
choices while creating innovative
educational programs, especially if lo-
cal school systems are unresponsive
to their needs. The NCLB also permits
parents to withdraw their children from
failing public schools and to enroll
them in others public schools of their
choice. While this last option has yet
to become effective, it may well be the
most effective means of quality control
in public education.
Even though it may be years
before the full impact of how the NCLB
will influence the rights of students and
their parents, one thing is certain:
consistent with the American approach
to dispute resolution, the trickle135 of
litigation over this lengthy law is soon
to develop into a torrent of lawsuits.
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